When Constitutional silence meets democratic speech

In recent years, growing public unease over the role of Presidents and Governors has centred less on what they say, and more on what they do not. As their addresses to Parliament and State Assemblies increasingly mirror executive narratives, questions arise about constitutional silence, democratic accountability, and the spaces left unoccupied by restraint. This write-up is necessitated by that unease. It does not seek activist constitutional heads or dramatic institutional confrontation. Instead, it examines—calmly and precisely—the limits placed on these offices, what they can still do within those limits, and how a vigilant democratic ecosystem must fill the space that constitutional design intentionally leaves open.

Dignity without discretion: the constitutional position

India’s Constitution assigns the President and Governors a role of high dignity but limited discretion. Their addresses to Parliament and State Assemblies, mandated under Articles 87 and 176 respectively, are delivered on the aid and advice of the elected government. This is not an oversight or a dilution of office; it is a deliberate design choice rooted in parliamentary democracy. The framers were clear that unelected constitutional heads should not become parallel centres of political authority.

As a result, these addresses are not intended to reflect independent judgment. They present the government’s account of its priorities and actions at the opening of a legislative year. Public discomfort arises when these speeches resemble partisan proclamations, but the constraint is structural, not personal. To expect Presidents or Governors to openly contradict the executive in such forums would be to misunderstand the system itself.

Why constitutional silence is built into the system

The Constitution places political accountability squarely where it belongs: on the executive before the legislature, and ultimately before the electorate. Presidents and Governors are therefore expected to exercise restraint, not intervention, in public discourse. Their silence on contentious matters—policy failures, administrative excesses, or political controversies—is not, by itself, a constitutional lapse.

This restraint protects democratic stability. A Head of State who publicly critiques the government risks blurring the line between ceremonial authority and political opposition. In a diverse and contested polity, such blurring could weaken, rather than strengthen, democratic legitimacy.

Restraint was never meant to be emptiness

Yet constitutional restraint does not require constitutional vacuity. Within their limited remit, Presidents and Governors retain meaningful—if quiet—avenues of influence. They may seek reconsideration of advice, raise concerns through formal correspondence, record objections on file, and frame their addresses in language that repeatedly affirms foundational principles: secularism, federal balance, institutional independence, equality before law, and respect for dissent.

These are not theatrical gestures. They are institutional signals. Over time, such signals create a constitutional record that courts, legislatures, scholars, and future governments can reference. The concern today is not that constitutional heads lack power, but that even these modest tools are used unevenly, sometimes assertively in matters of political control, and cautiously when broader constitutional norms are under strain.

The Motion of Thanks: where democracy speaks back

This is where the Constitution’s internal corrective mechanism becomes vital. The Motion of Thanks to the President’s or Governor’s address is not a ceremonial afterthought. It is the democratic counter-voice built into the system. While the address reflects the executive’s narrative, the debate on the Motion of Thanks belongs entirely to the legislature.

During this debate, elected representatives may scrutinise claims, challenge omissions, expose exaggerations, and raise precisely those concerns that constitutional heads cannot articulate publicly. Issues of governance failure, misuse of authority, federal imbalance, or rights erosion are meant to surface here. In effect, the Motion of Thanks fills the democratic space that constitutional restraint deliberately leaves open.

When this debate is substantive, extended, and evidence-based, democracy functions as designed. When it is rushed, disrupted, or reduced to partisan spectacle, constitutional silence begins to feel less like restraint and more like abdication. The quality of this debate, rather than the eloquence of the original address, is the true barometer of parliamentary health.

The indispensable role of a vigilant society

For legislative scrutiny to be meaningful, it must be supported by an alert democratic ecosystem. Media, judiciary, and civil society do not supplement democracy; they sustain it. Honest, non-jingoistic media reporting—particularly from regional and local outlets—often detects administrative excesses long before they acquire constitutional vocabulary. Such reporting documents impact, establishes patterns, and supplies legislators with material grounded in lived reality rather than abstraction.

Judicial responsiveness reinforces this ecosystem when courts hear rights-affecting matters in a timely manner and provide interim relief where harm is immediate. Civil society, when it documents and persists rather than merely protests, contributes institutional memory. Together, these forces create an environment in which accountability becomes routine rather than exceptional.

Democracy as a cumulative process

Indian democracy was never designed to depend on heroic interventions from constitutional heads. It was designed to thrive through cumulative pressure: restrained constitutional offices, argumentative legislatures, responsive courts, and a questioning public sphere. Presidents and Governors are not expected to rescue democracy, but neither should they be reduced to mechanical silence devoid of constitutional emphasis.

When legislatures debate seriously, media reports honestly, courts act in time, and citizens remain attentive, even the most constrained constitutional reminders gain force. In such a climate, restraint and accountability cease to be opposites; they become complements.

Completing constitutional silence

Constitutional silence, by itself, is not a failure. It becomes one only when democratic speech elsewhere weakens. The answer, therefore, does not lie in transforming Presidents or Governors into moral arbiters, but in restoring seriousness to the institutions meant to speak freely. Democracy thrives not when every office speaks loudly, but when each speaks where it is meant to, and when silence at the top is completed—rather than exposed—by accountability below.

(The writer is a retired officer of the IIS and a former Editor-in-Charge of DD News and AIR News , India’s national broadcasters, as well as Media-link Information Officer of PIB attached to various ministries. He has also worked as an international media consultant with UNICEF Nigeria and contributes regularly to various publications in India and abroad)