Can India Give BRICS a New Purpose? Part I: The Geopolitical Trap

BRICS returns to Delhi at a moment when the world seems unusually divided. But before asking what India can do with the grouping, it is worth asking what BRICS has achieved so far—and whether its original economic promise has been overtaken by geopolitics.

A Summit at a Difficult Moment

New Delhi is preparing to receive an unusual gathering of the world’s most consequential emerging powers. The 18th BRICS Summit will bring together the leaders of eleven member countries on September 12–13, along with partner countries and invited leaders. It comes at a particularly difficult moment for the international system: wars continue, trade is increasingly weaponised, supply chains are vulnerable, climate concerns have lost some of their earlier urgency, and the multilateral order appears weaker than it has been for decades.

For India, therefore, hosting BRICS is both an opportunity and a test.

The obvious question is one that is being asked with increasing frequency: what has India actually gained from BRICS? Hosting the summit will certainly add to India's diplomatic visibility. But diplomatic visibility is not the same thing as national gain. If BRICS is to matter to India, and indeed to the world, it must produce something more substantial than another carefully negotiated declaration.

Born as an Economic Idea

The origins of BRICS were, in fact, far more economic than geopolitical. The acronym BRIC was coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001 to describe four large emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India and China. The countries themselves gradually gave the idea institutional form, and the first BRIC summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011, giving the grouping its present name.

The original attraction was obvious. These were large countries, with large populations, substantial natural resources, expanding economies and a growing stake in the world economy, but relatively little voice in institutions designed when the economic balance of power was very different. BRICS therefore sought greater representation for emerging economies in global governance, closer economic cooperation and reform of institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Twenty years later, the landscape has changed dramatically. BRICS has expanded to eleven members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The enlarged grouping accounts for roughly half of the world's population and about two-fifths of global GDP in purchasing-power terms.

A Record That Is Neither Failure nor Triumph

Its institutional record is not insignificant. The most tangible achievement has been the New Development Bank, established in 2015 to finance infrastructure and sustainable development. By the end of 2025, the Bank had approved more than $40 billion for projects, including $9.1 billion for 28 projects in India. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement was another attempt to provide a degree of financial protection to member economies.

BRICS has also created an increasingly elaborate network of ministerial meetings and working groups covering trade, agriculture, health, science and technology, energy, environment, industry, education and other areas. India's current chairmanship has already produced some concrete initiatives. The BRICS industry ministers have worked on cooperation in MSMEs, photovoltaics, start-ups and logistics, while the trade ministers have been working towards a BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2030 and greater trade in services and more resilient global value chains.

Yet the question remains: has BRICS lived up to its promise?

The answer has to be qualified.

BRICS has certainly given India another important platform from which to engage the Global South and to press for a more representative international order. It has also provided a useful diplomatic space in which India can talk simultaneously to China, Russia, Brazil, the Gulf countries and others without having to place itself in any ideological camp.

But its economic potential remains considerably larger than its actual economic integration.

Partners in Trade, Rivals in Politics

And this is where the fundamental contradiction within BRICS becomes visible. The countries that sit around the same table are potential economic partners but, in several cases, political and strategic adversaries. India and China are the clearest example. Their economies are deeply interconnected, yet strategic trust remains fragile. Recent attempts to improve bilateral relations have created some space for engagement, but substantial distrust continues to constrain investment, technology cooperation and business relations.

The problem becomes still more complicated after the expansion of BRICS. Iran and Saudi Arabia are now members. So are the UAE and Egypt. Russia is at war with Ukraine. The United States is simultaneously a major economic partner for several BRICS countries and the principal strategic rival of others. China sees BRICS as part of a broader movement towards a less Western-dominated order. India has no interest in converting it into an anti-American or anti-Western alliance.

This is perhaps the most important strategic choice before India.

Should BRICS become a geopolitical counterweight to the West, or should it remain an economic and developmental coalition of emerging countries?

The Geopolitical Trap

The temptation to choose the first course will be considerable. The language of a multipolar world, de-dollarisation and resistance to unilateralism has an obvious appeal. The growing weight of BRICS makes such rhetoric politically attractive.

But it may also be a trap.

The moment BRICS begins to define itself principally in opposition to the United States or the West, its internal contradictions will become almost impossible to manage. Its members have very different political systems, strategic interests and relationships with Washington and Europe. Some depend heavily on Western markets and technology. Others are deeply antagonistic towards the existing Western-led order. There is no single geopolitical interest that can unite all of them.

(Uday Kumar Varma is an IAS officer. Retired as Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting)